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Abstract
Unlike the textbook model of a top manager being an omniscient plan-
ner, coordinator and monitor, the real life managers su⁄er from disconti-
nuity, lack of systematic information collection and limited time for analy-
sis and re￿ ection. Why do not business leaders set up their organizations
in the way that would allow themselves to make informed choices based
on thorough analysis? We argue that in some situations top managers
may bene￿t from being less informed. In our model, additional informa-
tion raises ex post ￿ exibility of the decision-makers which may undermine
the ex ante incentives of their subordinates to make speci￿c investments.
The subordinates expect less informed leaders to be more committed to
the original strategy which increases the returns to the strategy-speci￿c
investments. We show that this e⁄ect is more likely to take place in more
predictable environments; we also discuss how this e⁄ect depends on the
hierarchical structure of the organization.
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This paper studies the value of information for business leaders. In theory,
business leaders make important business decisions that a⁄ect payo⁄s of their
subordinates and shareholders; the leaders should therefore invest in obtaining
the best available information and in analyzing the information to provide the
basis for better responses to changing business conditions.
In his classical study, Fayol (1916) introduces the four main activities of top
managers: planning, organizing, coordinating, and controlling. These activities
are not possible without information on the external environment and subordi-
nates￿preferences and abilities. Yet, in reality managers do not seem to have
enough information; nor do they even seem to try obtaining the most precise
information that is potentially available. In a famous survey of empirical stud-
ies of top managers￿allocation of time, Henry Mintzberg (1973, 1975) showed
that the real life managers are strikingly di⁄erent from the textbook￿ s omni-
scient ones. Most empirical studies have shown that managers do not rely on
systematic collection of external information, nor they are engaged in re￿ ective
activities to analyze this information. Mintzberg summarizes these ￿ndings as
follows: ￿Study after study has shown that managers work at an unrelenting
pace, that their activities are characterized by brevity, variety, and discontinuity,
and that they are strongly oriented to action and dislike re￿ ective activities.￿
Why getting the most precise information does not seem to be a priority
for many managers? Mintzberg￿ s work suggests that managers are overworked
and have no time to learn. This may not be surprising: obtaining better in-
formation about each important issue may be very costly, given the extensive
span of control of a top manager and a high cost of her time. But this can
only explain the problem at the middle level. Certainly, a top manager is by
de￿nition the ultimate decision-making authority in the organization and can
re-arrange the organizational structure and his/her own schedule. Why cannot
top managers delegate other work so they can focus on the accumulation and
analysis of information critical for the quality of their strategic decisions? In
this paper, we argue that in some cases managers may actually be willing to
1stay less informed ￿ even if they can get better information at no cost. There-
fore, setting up an organizational structure that keeps them busy with other
activities may be an e⁄ective commitment device for not being informed.1
Why would not managers want to be better informed? We suggest an expla-
nation based on the understanding of the role of the leader in the transforma-
tional leadership theory.2 According to this theory, a transformational leader
is to provide the followers with a long-term vision rather than with short-term
rewards and punishments (the latter being used by a transactional rather than
transformational leader). In our model we show that less informed managers
may be better transformational leaders. Indeed, information about changing
business conditions provides an incentive to revise the organization￿ s strategy.
Once the manager learns that the current strategy is outdated, she may no
longer want to stay the course. Instead, she behaves opportunistically (as a
transactional leader). But such a change of strategy, while optimal from to-
day￿ s point of view, may actually be costly for the organization from the ex
ante perspective. Indeed, it may undermine the returns to strategy-speci￿c in-
vestments3 that the other members of the organization have undertaken in the
past. As long as such investments are noncontractible, the incentives to invest
will be lower if the leader is expected to be better informed.
We show that the leader￿ s payo⁄ is non-monotonic with respect to the qual-
ity of her information: as the leader￿ s signal about the optimal course of action
becomes more precise, her welfare ￿rst decreases (due to the weaker incentives of
subordinates). Only after a certain level of information quality, further improve-
ment in the signal￿ s precision has a positive e⁄ect ￿due to a higher probability of
1This is not an abstract speculation. So many organizations are built in the way where top
management does not obtain internal and external information that textbooks and business
school case studies give a special praise to the leaders who create structures that promote
information ￿ows. See, for example Besanko et al. (2003, ch. 18).
2Burns (1978) ￿rst described the concept of transformational (rather than transactional)
leadership in application to the political leaders. Bass (1985) extended this concept to the
case of business leaders.
3Such strategy-speci￿c investments range from acquiring speci￿c knowledge and experience
to building teams that are aimed at solving particular business problems to choosing residential
locations.
2making the right choice ex post.4 This relationship depends on the level of ini-
tial uncertainty about the optimal course of action: the higher the uncertainty,
the less likely the negative e⁄ect of information on ex ante payo⁄s. Indeed,
in the more uncertain environments, the value of ex post ￿ exibility is higher ￿
relative to the value of commitment.
Our paper is related to the growing literature on leadership and authority in
organization. Hermalin (1998) is one of the ￿rst papers to develop an economic
theory of leadership. In his model, a leader, possessing superior information
about the returns to her team￿ s e⁄ort, tries to persuade the followers either by
working hard herself (i.e., leading by example) or by giving a material sacri￿ce
(i.e. leading by sacri￿ce). While our model shares certain assumptions with
Hermalin￿ s, there are several crucial di⁄erences. First, in the main version of
our model the leader has no private information which could be revealed by her
actions. Second, instead of exerting e⁄ort she chooses a course of action (strat-
egy), this choice not being associated with any direct costs. This assumption,
realistic in many contexts, signi￿cantly limits the leader￿ s opportunities to lead
by example or sacri￿ce.
Another related work is Rotemberg and Saloner (1993) who explore how
leadership style (determined by the leader￿ s personal characteristics) can a⁄ect
initiative at the lower levels of the hierarchy and, ultimately, the ￿rm￿ s perfor-
mance. They suggest that hiring an emphatic leader, who, besides maximizing
pro￿t, cares about the well-being of her subordinates, may be a good strat-
egy: it helps to overcome the hold-up problem with respect to the subordinates￿
￿rm-speci￿c investment and thus fosters initiative. Moreover, Rotemberg and
Saloner (1993) show that emphatic leaders are also more inclined to develop
participatory, rather than autocratic leadership style, and are more likely to
delegate decisions to their subordinates. Rotemberg and Saloner (2000) show
that, alternatively, the ￿rm may want to hire a ￿visionary￿leader, who is known
to be biased towards certain strategies. This bias makes it more likely that in-
novative projects, proposed by the subordinates, will be implemented provided
4This result resembles the non-monotonic value of information in Morris and Shin (2002),
although the context is very di⁄erent.
3they are in line with the CEO￿ s vision; this, in turn, fosters initiative at the lower
levels of the hierarchy. Van den Steen (2005) shows that hiring a ￿visionary￿
leader helps to attract similarly minded subordinates to the organization.
The concept of a ￿visionary￿leader is related to leaders￿overcon￿dence. In
a recent paper, Bolton et al. (2008) show that some degree of overcon￿dence
(or ￿resoluteness￿ ) is optimal for e¢ cient coordination of subordinates￿actions,
even though it impairs an organization￿ s ability to adapt to changing circum-
stances. Thus, choosing a resolute leader is an e⁄ective instrument that allows
an organization to ensure internal cohesion. Bolton et al. also note that re-
stricting a rational leader￿ s access to information ￿making it costly ￿has a
similar e⁄ect. We see their work as highly complementary to ours as it reveals
reasons that may encourage the organization to limit the information available
to its leader (or limit her information-processing ability). While Bolton et al.
focus on coordination issues when team members￿incentives are aligned, we are
concerned with stimulating subordinates￿costly e⁄orts when the leader cannot
directly commit to reward them. For Bolton et al.￿ s model it is essential that
there is a large number of followers who value coordination with the leader and
among themselves. In our model, the argument holds with a single follower.
Our contribution is to model the bene￿ts of uninformed leadership in a
rational choice rather than behavioral model ￿all agents have the same prior,
there is no over-con￿dence or over-optimism. The leader chooses to be poorly
informed, e.g., by explicitly cutting information channels in the organization or
choosing a very tight schedule. In this sense, our work is similar to Blanes-i-
Vidal and Moller (2007) who model leaders with and without over-con￿dence.
They show that without over-con￿dence, a leader may not want to share hard
information. This happens because the leader cannot credibly communicate soft
information and the subordinates￿choices based on hard information alone may
be distorted. The leader prefers not to share her own information and instead
rely on subordinates￿views ￿ so that the subordinates implement the project
they prefer. Blanes-i-Vidal and Moller (2007) also show that over-con￿dence
bias helps to reduce this distortion.
Our paper is also closely related to a seminal paper by Aghion and Tirole
4(1997) on allocation of authority in organizations. One of the central themes
there, as well as in our paper, is that the (fully rational) leader may be hurt by
becoming better informed: the more informed the leader, the lower the subordi-
nates￿incentives to acquire information about the project. There are, however,
important di⁄erences between the models. In Aghion and Tirole (1997), the
leader and the follower are in symmetric positions: both are searching for a
project that is optimal from the personal perspective. In our paper, in contrast,
the leader is responsible for decision making, while the subordinate￿ s e⁄ort con-
tributes to the expected joint payo⁄from the project, chosen by the boss. While
Aghion and Tirole focus on the determinants of formal and real authority in or-
ganizations in the presence of the con￿ ict of interests between the principal and
the agent, we explore how such factors as the degree of (exogenous) uncertainty
with respect to the optimal course of action and the structure of the organi-
zation a⁄ect the leader￿ s costs and bene￿ts from obtaining better information.
We also explore how leaders can establish reputation for being poorly informed
by withdrawing from interference.
There is also a large contract-theoretic literature on bene￿ts of having less
rather than more information. The most in￿ uential theme is related to the career
concerns model (Holmstrom, 1999). If the agent￿ s type is not observed, the agent
has an incentive to exert high e⁄ort to convince the market she is productive.
Dewatripont et al. (1999) and Prat (2003) show that in this environment,
better information about the agent￿ s type may therefore undermine the agent￿ s
incentives to exert e⁄ort and reduce social surplus. The most relevant paper is
Cremer (1995) where the principal may prefer an ￿arm-length￿relationship to
a close one. In the case of an arm-length relationship, information acquisition is
costly, hence it is easy for the principal to commit to threats that are ine¢ cient
ex post but provide strong incentives ex ante.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we present the
setting. In Section 3, we solve for the equilibrium and show that better informed
leaders may be less e⁄ective. In Section 4 we discuss comparative statics and
extensions. Section 5 concludes.
52 Setting
We consider a model with two risk-neutral agents, a leader L and a follower
F. The leader moves ￿rst and chooses a project. The follower moves second
and makes a costly investment which is speci￿c to the project chosen by the
leader. After the investment is made, the leader receives new information and
may revise her initial choice. We will study the e⁄ect of the quality of this new
information on the social welfare and on the leader￿ s own welfare.
Formally, there are m > 1 projects, m ￿ 1 of them being ￿regular￿projects
and one of them being a ￿star￿project. Ex ante, it is not known which project
is the star project. The leader and the follower have the same prior: the projects
are symmetric ex ante, so that the probability of each project to be a star project
is 1=m:
After the follower￿ s e⁄ort is sunk, the leader receives a signal which identi￿es
the star project with probability p: With probability 1 ￿ p; the signal is not
informative. If p is high, we will refer to the leader as being ￿better informed￿ .
We assume that p is known ex ante to both agents.
A regular project generates a payo⁄ of V if it is successful. The probability
of success depends on the follower￿ s e⁄ort a￿[0;1] invested in this project. For
simplicity￿ s sake, the probability of success equals this e⁄ort. The cost of the
e⁄ort is C(a): In what follows, we assume C(a) = ca2=2 where c is an exogenous
parameter; we assume that c is such that a < 1 in any equilibrium.
If the star project is implemented, it generates an additional payo⁄ of V ￿
with probability 1, where V ￿ > V:
The assumption that the incremental payo⁄ to the star project does not
depend on the e⁄ort a is important. Essentially, it implies that the quality of the
project choice and the follower￿ s e⁄ort are substitutes rather than complements.
If the star project is chosen correctly, the project is so good that the additional
payo⁄ always materializes ￿whatever the follower￿ s e⁄ort a.
The payo⁄s are not contractible. Therefore once the uncertainty is realized,
the parties bargain over the division of the joint surplus. The leader￿ s bargaining
power is ￿; the follower￿ s bargaining power is 1 ￿ ￿:
6The timing is as follows:
1. The leader chooses a project i = 1;:::;m.
2. The follower observes the leader￿ s choice and makes her investment a: In
principle, the follower can invest in any project but it is obvious that
the follower will only invest in project i: The follower incurs the cost of
investment ca2=2
3. The leader receives a signal. With an (exogenous) probability p the leader
learns the true identity of the star project i￿; with probability (1￿p) the
leader receives no new information.
4. The leader may change the choice of the project. If the new choice j is
the same as her initial choice then the follower￿ s investment pays o⁄. If
j 6= i; then the follower￿ s prior investment has no value.
5. The uncertainty is realized and the parties divide returns from the project
proportionally to ￿ : 1 ￿ ￿:
Formally, whenever i = j; the project brings value V with probability a: If
j = i￿, then there is an additional payo⁄ of V ￿.
3 Equilibrium
3.1 Project choice and e⁄ort
Let us now describe the ex ante and ex post choice of the project. Ex ante, all
projects are symmetric, so that each project can be a ￿star￿with probability
1=m. Thus the leader chooses the project i randomly.
The ex post choice depends on the leader￿ s information. If the leader does
not receive any new information (this happens with probability 1 ￿ p), the
projects are again symmetric. Therefore there are no incentives to revisit the
ex ante choice. Indeed, changing course would destroy the follower￿ s investment
but would not generate any additional gains. Therefore the leader keeps her
7initial choice j = i: Notice that the leader may be lucky: with probability 1=m;
her original choice is correct i = i￿:
If the leader receives information on the star project (this takes place with
probability p); then her choice may change. As we have assumed above V ￿ >
V > aV , it always pays o⁄ to choose the star project j = i￿: It may happen
that there is no need to change the ex ante decision (if i = i￿): But even if the
original choice was wrong i 6= i￿; the leader prefers to lose the gains of sticking
to the prior decision aV and receive the bene￿ts of the right choice V ￿:

















The ￿rst term in the expression above is the payo⁄ in the case when the leader
is not informed. The second term corresponds to the case where the leaders
learns the true identity of the star project and it happens to be the same as
the ex ante choice i = i￿: The third term is the contingency when the leader is
informed and the star project is di⁄erent from the one chosen ex ante i 6= i￿:
Taking into account the outcome of bargaining, we obtain the following
expected utilities for the leader and the follower, respectively:
UL = ￿aV
￿











UF = (1 ￿ ￿)aV
￿














The follower￿ s e⁄ort a maximizes UF; which is a concave function of a. The











3.2 When are better informed leaders less e⁄ective?
In this section we show that a higher quality of information p may reduce the
leader￿ s payo⁄ and the social welfare.
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Straightforward di⁄erentiation of these expressions leads to the following
Proposition 1. If V ￿ < 2(1￿￿)V 2=c; the leader￿ s payo⁄ UL is non-monotonic








and increases otherwise. If V ￿ ￿ 2(1￿￿)V 2=c; the leader￿ s
payo⁄ is an increasing function of p. Similarly, the follower￿ s payo⁄ UF is non-
monotonic in p whenever V ￿ < (1 ￿ ￿)V 2=c: The social welfare UF + UL is
non-monotonic if and only if V ￿ < (1 ￿ ￿2)V 2=c:
In all the three cases, the non-monotonicity is explained by the trade-o⁄
between the costs and the bene￿ts of being better informed. If the leader gets
better information (p increases), she becomes more likely to choose the right
project ex post. However, this may result in changing the project mid-course;
therefore, the follower￿ s incentives to invest are weaker. When the leader is well
informed (p is high), the project is likely to be changed anyway, so a decrease of
the agent￿ s e⁄ort is not essential. In contrast, for low values of p the loss of the
agent￿ s incentives may overwhelm the positive e⁄ect from better information.
Figure 1 presents a numerical example where the leader￿ s payo⁄ and the
social welfare are non-monotonic functions of the quality of information.
Our analysis implies that the leader￿ s payo⁄increases in the quality of infor-
mation when this quality is high ￿and decreases in the quality of information
when this quality is low. This is an important observation which can predict
that the leaders should prefer extremes ￿either being perfectly informed (and
neglect the follower￿ s investment) or being perfectly uninformed (which provides
very strong incentives for the followers).
Note also that the leader￿ s payo⁄ is a convex function of p. This implies













Figure 1: Utility of the leader UL, utility of the follower UF, and the joint
surplus UL + UF as a function of the quality of the leader￿ s information p:
Parameters: ￿ = 0:5; V = 1, c = 0:5, V ￿ = 1:2;m = 1:
10they are in realizing a forthcoming project (assuming that p becomes common
knowledge before the leader chooses the course of action), and gain from a
mean-preserving spread in the distribution of p.
4 Comparative statics and extensions
4.1 E⁄ect of uncertainty
In this section we discuss the e⁄ect of the leader￿ s information on welfare when
the environment becomes more uncertain and it gets harder to identify the
star project ex ante (i.e. the number of initially available projects m grows).









where the leader￿ s payo⁄decreases in the quality of information provided such a
range exists (condition for the existence of non-monotonicity V ￿ < 2(1￿￿)V 2=c
is not a⁄ected).
On the other hand, an increase of uncertainty is not equivalent to a mere
increase in m: To preserve the expected value of the star project, we need to
consider a proportional increase in both m and V ￿. In this case, the e⁄ect is
even stronger. Indeed, consider two situations: (i) the case of low uncertainty,
low m and low V ￿ and the case of (ii) high uncertainty where both m and V ￿
are high. In (i) both the condition of non-monotonicity V ￿ < 2(1 ￿ ￿)V 2=c is











The analysis above implies that if uncertainty is high, it is more likely that
the leader bene￿ts from being better informed. Indeed, in this case information
and ￿ exibility are more valuable. There are several e⁄ects at work. First, ex
post the leader is more likely to change course (the probability that the initial
choice is the right one, 1=m, decreases) so the value of the follower￿ s investment
is lower. Moreover, this e⁄ect is magni￿ed since the follower has weaker ex ante
incentives to invest in any speci￿c project as it is less likely to be the star project
(1=m is low). Lastly, as V ￿ is high, the gain from learning the star project is
higher.
114.2 Multiple followers
In Bolton et al. (2008), the resolute leaders encourage cooperation between a
continuum of followers. In the model above, we consider the e⁄ect of the leader￿ s
information on the incentives of a single subordinate. What would happen in our
model with a ￿nite number of followers? Would the uninformed leaders be more
e⁄ective as the number of followers/subordinates in the corporate hierarchy
increases (i.e. as the hierarchy becomes ￿ atter)?
Let us consider a model above where the probability of success of a regular
project consists of the e⁄orts of N followers: a =
PN
n=1 an: We assume that
their e⁄ort decisions an are independent and their cost functions are symmetric
CN(an): The cost functions CN(￿) depend on the number of followers in such a
way that the probability of success a in equilibrium is constant with regard to
N. In particular, if the cost functions are quadratic, then CN(an) = 1
2Nca2
n:
What would be the e⁄ect of change in N on the e⁄ect of information on
welfare in this case, @2UL=(@N@p)? It is easy to check that in the case of
quadratic e⁄ort function there is no e⁄ect of N on @UL=@p: The intuition is
very simple. In the case of quadratic function, the follower￿ s e⁄ort choice is
a linear function of the project￿ s payo⁄ and of the quality of information (3).
Therefore there is no interaction between the e⁄ects of information and that of
the number of subordinates on the followers￿e⁄orts.
The situation would be very di⁄erent if the cost function were not quadratic.
For example, if C(a) = ak; k > 2, marginal cost is convex rather than linear,
therefore the optimal e⁄ort function (the inverse marginal cost function) is con-
cave. In this case, the e⁄ect of information on e⁄ort (and therefore the e⁄ect
on welfare) increases with N. Indeed, if there are many followers, each of them
strongly responds even to a small change in incentives. The overall increase in
incentives is therefore larger.
In the case where C(a) = ak; k < 2; the e⁄ect of N is just the opposite. The
optimal e⁄ort function C0￿1(￿) is convex. The greater the number of followers
N, the weaker the response in incentives of each follower, and the impact on
the aggregate probability of success.
12This brief analysis shows that the interaction between the e⁄ect of informa-
tion and the structure of hierarchy is complex and depends on parameters of
technology. In particular, it would be misleading to study this interaction based
on the quadratic case (like it is done in many papers in this literature).
4.3 Endogenous quality of information
In the model above, the quality of information p is exogenous. Let us consider a
di⁄erent setting where the leader can invest in building an information structure
with a higher p: Let us suppose that before the game in Section 2 begins, the
leader can increase the probability p of learning the true identity of the star
project at a constant marginal cost ￿. Then she maximizes the function UL(p) ￿
￿p: As UL(p) is a convex function, the optimal quality of information is either
p = 0 or p = 1: Thus we arrive at the following result.
The leader will prefer to be perfectly informed p = 1 if and only if ￿ <
UL(1) ￿ UL(0) = ￿1




+ ￿V ￿ m￿1
m : Otherwise, the leader
prefers to be perfectly uninformed p = 0:
Notice that if the marginal cost of information ￿ is increasing rather than
constant, than the leader￿ s payo⁄ does not have to be a convex function of p; in
this case there may be an intermediate solution p 2 (0;1):
4.4 Asymmetric information about the quality of infor-
mation
So far we have assumed that the quality of the leader￿ s information p is com-
mon knowledge. Indeed, as far as it is determined by the leader￿ s deliberate
choice, such as the scope of her responsibility in the organization, her working
schedule etc., assuming that p is observed by the agent may be a reasonable
approximation. Yet, it is also interesting to investigate what happens when we
depart from this assumption and treat p as the leader￿ s private information. In
this case, the leader￿ s behavior may reveal to the follower how well the leader is
informed. In this subsection we consider a version of the model in which there
are two consecutive projects with identical characteristics. The leader￿ s deci-
13sion whether to switch the strategy for the ￿rst project may a⁄ect the agent￿ s
incentives to work on the second one. Let us explore this e⁄ect more formally.
Assume that it is common knowledge that the quality of the leader￿ s infor-
mation p is distributed on [p; ￿ p] with a c.d.f. F(p) and a continuous density
f(p) > 0, the precise value of p being the leader￿ s private information. Let us
also assume that the events that the leader learns the ￿star￿strategy in periods
1 and 2 are independent. For simplicity, we normalize the discount factor to one.
The agent does not observe whether the leader obtained the signal in period 1,
but can infer it from her decision whether to switch projects. We shall look for
Perfect Bayesian Equilibria (PBE) of this game. We assume that the principal
does not switch strategies if indi⁄erent (this assumption can be easily justi￿ed
by introducing a small switching cost).
Denote by pS and pN the quality of the leader￿ s information estimated by
the follower after the strategy was changed in the ￿rst period or not changed,
respectively. Then, the follower￿ s second-period e⁄orts in case of switching the
￿rst project or not, eS
2 and eN
2 , are given by (3) with p = pS or p = pN.
The ￿rst-period e⁄ort e1 can be also found from (3) with p be replaced by its
expected value E[p]. Since the leader￿ s second-period decision has no impact
on the follower￿ s e⁄ort, she always switches to the star strategy whenever she
learns which strategy it is. In the ￿rst period, however, the leader￿ s decision
whether to switch potentially a⁄ects the follower￿ s beliefs about how informed
is the leader.
Proposition 2. In any PBE there exists ^ p 2 [p; ￿ p] such that the leader switches
to the ￿star￿strategy in period 1 if p > ^ p and does not switch otherwise.
Proof. Let UL
S (p) and UL
N(p) be the leader￿ s expected second-period payo⁄ if





￿(1 ￿ ￿)V 2
c






)(pS ￿ pN): (4)
If some type of leader with p = ~ p prefers not to switch, then ￿(~ p) is at least as
large as the short-term gain from switching to the star strategy, V ￿￿a1V . This
14implies that pS ￿ pN ￿swithcing strategies the follower￿ s expectation of the
quality of the leader￿ s signal. Hence, ￿(p) is a decreasing function of p and it
is optimal not to switch to the star project for all types of the leader p ￿ ~ p:
Proposition 2 implies that5
pS =
E[p2jp > ^ p]




E[p] ￿ E[p2jp > ^ p](1 ￿ F(^ p))
1 ￿ (1 ￿ F(^ p))E[pjp > ^ p]
: (6)
We can now fully characterize all the three possible types of equilibria. In the
￿rst kind of equilibria, all types of leaders prefer to switch to the star project
if they get a signal about its identity, i.e. ^ p = p. Then, the necessary and







1￿E[p] : Note that although all types of the leader
behave identically, the fact of switching projects a⁄ects the leader￿ s reputation
because this event is more likely when p is high.
In the second type of equilibrium the leader never switches to the star
project, so that pN = E[p]. Note that in this case switching strategies is an
out-of-equilibrium event and the follower can have any beliefs. If such an equi-
librium exists, it exists with the ￿worst￿beliefs, pS = p; so the necessary and
su¢ cient condition for the existence of this equilibrium is ￿(p) > V ￿ ￿ a1V
with pS = p;pN = E[p]:
5To see this, note that the followers￿beliefs if the leader does and does not switch strategies,





0 if p < ^ p
pf(p)







1￿(1￿F(^ p))E[pjp>^ p] if p < ^ p
(1￿p)f(p)
1￿(1￿F(^ p))E[pjp>^ p] if p > ^ p
Then, the likelihood ratio fS(p)=fN(p) is increasing, pS > pN. If ^ p = p; so that no type of
leader interferes, fN(p) is given by the same formula, while fS(p) is not restricted by Bayesian
updating.
15Finally, if there exists ^ p such that ￿(^ p) = V ￿ ￿ a1V with pS and pN
given by (5),(6), then there exist equilibria in which more informed types of the
leader (p > ^ p) prefer to switch strategies, while the less informed types (p < ^ p)
withdraw from doing this. In this case the leader￿ s reputation is a⁄ected both
by the likelihood of getting information about the star strategy and by the
di⁄erence in the reaction to this information of di⁄erent types of the leader.
Why di⁄erent types of the leader behave di⁄erently? The reason is that the
less informed types (those with lower values of p) are less likely to learn the star
strategy in the second period. Hence, they are less likely to switch strategies
in the second period, so their return to the subordinate￿ s e⁄ort is higher and,
thus, incentives to build reputation are stronger.
5 Conclusions
Our paper shows that less informed managers may be better leaders. In our
model, managers are fully rational; their job is to choose a strategy for the
￿rm. Yet, they may gain from restricting their own access to information. The
reason is that less informed leaders can commit in a more credible way to their
original choice of strategy. This, in turn, provides stronger incentives for speci￿c
investments by the followers. If the followers know that their leaders are better
informed, they will expect the leaders to adapt to changing business conditions
which will in turn undermine the value of the followers￿speci￿c investments.
With uninformed leaders such ￿ exibility is less likely.
In this paper, a more informed leader is the one who is more likely to become
well informed at some interim stage. Of course, an alternative setting would
be that a more informed leader is more likely to choose the ￿star￿project from
the beginning. In our model getting better information in that sense would be
unambiguously good for the leader. Yet, if we think of a more general model, in
which the leader￿ s decision to seek more information gives her actually a bun-
dle ￿an informative signal with probability p0 at the ex ante stage and with
probability p1 at the interim stage ￿the leader may well want to avoid seeking
information under certain parameters, as in our simpler model. Moreover, being
16better informed from the beginning may also hurt a leader. In a complementary
work, Guriev et al. (2009), we explore a model in which the leader may com-
pensate her imperfect knowledge by actively participating in the project; such
involvement is costly for the leader but guarantees success of the project. The
leader￿ s contribution (via the right choice or via active involvement) and the
follower￿ s e⁄ort are complementary. We show that if the leader cannot directly
commit to work hard, being poorly informed acts as an implicit commitment
and may bene￿t her by boosting the agent￿ s incentives. As in the current paper,
the leader prefers extremes: being poorly informed or perfectly informed.6
Our other main result￿ that a leader prefers extremes with respect to how
well she is informed￿ has important dynamic implications. It predicts that a
leader should either get involved in a series of related projects to get experience
and become well informed in a speci￿c ￿eld, or, alternatively, frequently switch
activities in which she is involved ￿otherwise, she cannot credibly convince the
subordinates that she is poorly informed. This dynamic choice problem is an
interesting topic for future research.
6The fact that leaders prefer extremes in both models is in stark contrast with Lazear￿ s
(2005) theory of entrepreneurship, in which he shows that a successful entrepreneur must be
a ￿jack-of-all-trades￿. To what extent an entrepreneur must be a leader and a leader must
possess entrepreneurial qualities is an interesting question for further research.
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